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EXHAUSTED YET? STEPHENS V. PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORPORATION AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE TO STATUTEBASED ERISA CLAIMS
Carson D. Phillips-Spotts*
I. INTRODUCTION
By 1974, the U.S. Congress recognized that employer-provided retirement
pension plans had “become an important factor affecting the stabilization of
employment and the successful development of industrial relations”1 and enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) with the aim of protecting
“the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.”2 In
enacting ERISA, Congress established “standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation[s] for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans” and provided for
“appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to the Federal courts.”3 Apart
from creating federal causes of action to ensure efficient and equitable
administration of private pension plans, Congress also mandated that pension plan
providers establish certain administrative procedures through which beneficiaries
may seek redress in the event of conflict. The dual and, at times, conflicting aims
of providing plan participants access to federal courts while simultaneously
attempting to strengthen internal remedies made available by the providers have
created significant debate in federal courts. On the one hand, some federal courts,
focusing their analyses on Congress’ intention that pension plan providers create
and develop internal procedures through which aggrieved participants may seek
relief, have held that the exhaustion of these internal remedies by employees is a
prerequisite to bringing a federal court claim under ERISA.4 On the other hand, the
majority of federal circuit courts have held that Congress’ explicit intent to provide
pension plan participants a form of relief under federal law does not require that
they first exhaust all internal administrative remedies provided to them by plan

* J.D. candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law. The Author is grateful to professors
Dave Owen and Angela Arey for their invaluable guidance and advice, and to his colleagues on Maine
Law Review for their assistance, and more importantly for their patience. Additionally, the Author
would like to thank his family and friends for their unyielding support; Kyle Donovan and Zack Benuck
for being the source of outstanding advice; and to the Immigration Services Department of the LAA for
their wisdom and encouragement. The Author dedicates this piece to his parents who have never ceased
loving and supporting him.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(a), 88 Stat 829,
832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).
2. Id. at § 2(b), 88 Stat. 829, 833.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1996); Mason v. Cont’l
Grp., 763 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1985); Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir.
1983).
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providers before bringing an ERISA claim.5 These two competing viewpoints have
created a split among the federal circuits, and Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.6 is a recent case that considered the exhaustion doctrine and further deepened
the rift among the courts.
Although the ERISA statute itself does not require a plaintiff to exhaust all
remedies at her disposal before bringing a claim, the federal courts have universally
been understood to have the power to require exhaustion of such remedies as a
matter of discretion.7 Under the framework of the exhaustion doctrine, federal
courts may dismiss claims over which they would normally have jurisdiction if a
plaintiff fails to first exhaust the internal remedies available to her before bringing
suit.8 The rationale behind the application of the doctrine in the context of ERISA
claims is based principally on the assumption that Congress intended plan
participants to utilize the internal administrative remedies mandated by the statute;
and by ensuring that the internal remedies were utilized, the ERISA statutory
scheme would be better executed.9 Although it is unquestioned that federal courts
may apply the exhaustion doctrine at their discretion, there is much debate about
the doctrine’s reach, especially as it pertains to statutory claims arising under
ERISA. The debate at its core involves broader, competing notions of the
interpretation of Congressional intent, institutional competence, and the role of
private dispute resolution vehicles within the federal statutory scheme. Both sides
of the circuit split have invoked and developed compelling arguments to support
their positions, and the Stephens court weighs these competing interests in arriving
at its holding10
The aims of this Note are twofold: the first objective is to review and analyze
the state of the jurisprudence regarding the application of the exhaustion doctrine to
claims arising under ERISA. The second objective of this Note is to predict how
the First Circuit and the Supreme Court would likely handle the issue of the
application of the exhaustion doctrine to these claims. These objectives are
achieved over the Note’s succeeding three parts. Part II provides a summation of
the factual and procedural backgrounds leading up to Stephens and an analysis of
the court’s holding. Part III examines the rationales driving the prevailing
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1999); Held v. Mfrs. Hanover
Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 1990); Zipf v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889,
891-94 (3d Cir. 1986); Amaro v. Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1984).
6. 755 F.3d 959 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
7. Id. at 964.
8. See, e.g., King v. James River-Pepperell, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that
the plaintiff’s federal action was barred by her failure to comply with the reinstatement procedure
provided by the collective bargaining agreement); Delisi v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 580 F. Supp.
1572, 1574 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (dismissing the plaintiff’s ERISA claims on the grounds that he did not first
comply with the claims appeals process provided by the plan before bringing suit in the federal courts).
9. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that “the institution of such
administrative claim-resolution procedures was apparently intended by Congress to help reduce the
number of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent treatment of claims for benefits;
[and] to provide a nonadversarial method of claims settlement; . . . It would certainly be anomalous if
the same good reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered plans to
provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not lead the courts to see that those
remedies are regularly used.”).
10. Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 755 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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arguments in both the majority and minority circuits. Finally, Part IV provides a
prospective outlook and explains how, based on established jurisprudence and in
light of the Stephens decision, the First Circuit and the Supreme Court would likely
side with the majority of the circuits and hold that the doctrine does not apply to
claims invoking substantive rights protected by the statute.
II. STEPHENS V. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION
A. Procedural and Factual Background
In 1996, the plaintiff, James Stephens, retired from his position as a U.S.
Airways pilot.11 As a retiring U.S. Airways employee and a participant in the U.S.
Airways retirement pension plan, Stephens was entitled to retirement benefits in the
form of a lump sum to be paid out on a certain date after the commencement of his
retirement.12 Mr. Stephens’s lump sum benefits, however, were actually paid out
approximately forty-five days after the date of payment fixed by the pension plan.13
As a result of the delayed payment, Stephens filed an administrative claim with
U.S. Airways seeking to recover the sum of $3,665.06, an amount representative of
the interest that accrued on the lump sum payment during the forty-five day
delay.14 In bringing his administrative claim, Stephens asserted that the delayed
payment violated both the terms of the U.S. Airways pension plan and ERISA,
which requires that “any lump sum benefit be the ‘actuarial equivalent’ of the
annuity benefit.”15 U.S. Airways denied Mr. Stephens’s claim and he appealed to
the U.S. Airways Retirement Board, where his appeal was also denied.16
Subsequent to the Retirement Board’s denial of Mr. Stephens’s claim, he filed a
complaint against U.S. Airways and the retirement plan administrators in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging six different causes of
action under ERISA.17
The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but
the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.18 Subsequent to the reversal, the U.S.
Airways pension plan dissolved as a result of the U.S. Airways bankruptcy, and the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal agency, was substituted
as the defendant and trustee of the pension plan.19 Accordingly, the case was
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,20 and in 2008 the

11. Stephens, 755 F.3d at 962.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3)
(1994)).
16. Id.
17. Stephens v. Ret. Income Plan for Pilots of U.S. Air, Inc., 464 F.3d 606, 607 (6th Cir. 2006).
18. Id. at 614-15 (reversing the on the grounds that the District Court erred in attempting to evaluate
the merits of the substantive claim instead of conducting an analysis pertinent to determining whether
the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter).
19. Stephens, 755 F.3d at 962.
20. Stephens v. United Airways Grp., Inc., No. 4:00-CV-144, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98665, at *6
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
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district court granted summary judgment in PBGC’s favor.21 Stephens appealed,
and a panel of the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed in part,22 and reversed and
remanded to determine the proper amount due to Stephens for “unreasonable”
delays in payment under the plan.23
On remand, Stephens sought to certify a class of similarly situated pilots who
had also received delayed payments under the U.S. Airways retirement plan.24 The
district court denied Stephens’s motion to form a class, holding that Stephens was
the only plaintiff out of the proposed class of 650 who had exhausted all of the
internal administrative remedies provided by the retirement plan before filing
suit.25 The district court noted that because Stephens had exhausted all internal
administrative remedies available to him under the plan, he was not “typical” of the
class, and rejected his argument that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was
a non-factor because it was not required for claims seeking to enforce statutorilybased guarantees under ERISA.26 The district court based its decision to deny the
formation of the class on a possible affirmative defense available to PBGC rooted
in the exhaustion doctrine, stating that “Stephens’s case is in a drastically different
posture from the cases of other putative plaintiffs as to a potentially dispositive
affirmative defense asserted by PBGC.”27 The court thus held that because PBGC
would potentially be able to invoke the exhaustion doctrine as an affirmative
defense as to the claims of Stephens’s peers, but not as to Stephens’s claim, class
certification was not appropriate.28 After the district court denied Stephens’s
motion to create a class, he settled his personal claim with PBGC out of court so as
to obtain a final appealable judgment.29 Stephens subsequently appealed, claiming
that the district court erred in not certifying the class on the grounds that his and his
colleagues’ ERISA claims were purely statutory and were thus not subject to the
application of the exhaustion doctrine.30
B. Stephens and the Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the central
issue before the court was whether or not the class members seeking to join
Stephens in his ERISA claim had to have first exhausted all internal remedies

21. Stephens v. US Airways Grp., 555 F. Supp.2d 112, 123-24 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying PBGC’s
motion to dismiss and granting plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class on the grounds that “a plan
participant must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in a federal court.”).
22. Stephens v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 644 F.3d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming the district
court’s denial of the payment of attorney’s fees).
23. Id.
24. Stephens v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 908 F. Supp.2d 10, 11 (D.D.C. 2012).
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 14. The court classified the plaintiffs’ claims to be contractual and not statute-based,
concluding that “[b]ecause the issue now before the Court poses a question of plan administration and
not a question of statutory interpretation or application, the common application of prelitigation
exhaustion applies to all plaintiffs.” Id. at 16.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 755 F.3d 959, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
30. Id. at 964.
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before qualifying for class status.31 The court began its analysis by recognizing that
the application of the exhaustion doctrine is a matter of judicial discretion and is
not explicitly required by the ERISA statute.32 The court then explored the
exhaustion doctrine’s aims of effectuating “Congress’s purpose in requiring that
benefit plans provide for administrative review procedures by ensuring those
internal remedial procedures are utilized.”33 The court also noted that the doctrine
“‘enables plan administrators to apply their expertise and exercise their discretion
to . . . make considered interpretations of plan provisions, and assemble a factual
record that will assist the court in reviewing the administrators’ actions.’”34
After reviewing the doctrine’s aims and benefits, the court next analyzed the
rationales for the countervailing proposition that the doctrine should not be applied
to statutory claims arising under ERISA because “‘Congress intended that a body
of Federal substantive law w[ould] be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving the rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.’”35
The court recognized that the two views on the application of the doctrine created a
split among the federal circuits, and ultimately sided with the majority of the
circuits in holding that “pension plan beneficiaries need not exhaust internal
remedial procedures before proceeding to federal court when they assert violations
of ERISA’s substantive guarantees.”36 The court thus concluded that because the
plaintiffs’ claims regarding delayed payment of retirement benefits invoked
inherently substantive rights under ERISA, and did not require contractual
interpretation under the benefit plan, the exhaustion doctrine did not apply.37
With its decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit became the sixth
federal circuit to explicitly hold that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply to claims
involving substantive guarantees under ERISA.38 The court carefully weighed
arguments both in favor39 and against40 applying the doctrine and held that
Congress’ intent would be better served by not requiring exhaustion of internal
remedies in cases that involve the benefits under, and interpretation of the ERISA
31. Id.
32. Id. at 964 (stating that “[a]lthough ERISA itself does not require a plan beneficiary to exhaust
internal plan remedies before bringing suit, courts have universally applied the requirement as a matter
of judicial discretion.”).
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir.
1994)).
35. Id. (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980)) (alteration in original).
36. Id. at 966 (stating that “[t]his balancing compels us to require claimants to exhaust internal
remedies when they assert rights guaranteed by a benefit plan. But it logically suggests direct resort to
the federal courts where claimants assert statutory rights—a practice that better promotes Congress’s
intent to create minimum terms and conditions for payment plans.”).
37. Id.
38. Id. (noting that in holding that the doctrine did not apply to statute-based claims that the D.C.
Circuit was in agreement with “the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.”).
39. Id. (stating that “we are called upon to balance . . . competing interests recognized by ERISA,”
and that on the one hand, “Congress intended that plan administrators have primary responsibility in
adjudicating benefits claims to promote the consistent treatment of claims and to minimize the burden
on the courts and on all parties.”).
40. Id. (stating that on the other hand, “Congress intended for the courts to develop a body of
federal substantive law that would address issues involving rights and obligations under pension
plans.”).

2015] STEPHENS V. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION 383
statute. In order to understand fully the state of the law regarding the exhaustion
doctrine and the current circuit split, it is helpful to analyze the doctrine in its
differing applications among the circuits.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Majority View
As mentioned previously, the majority of the federal circuits have held that
exhaustion is not required when a plaintiff asserts a statutory claim under ERISA.41
The Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that the exhaustion
requirement applies to both claims asserting statutory guarantees under ERISA as
well as conflicts arising under plan contracts.42 In analyzing the two competing
theories pertaining to the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine, we turn first to
the majority view, which distinguishes claims arising from a possible breach of a
plan contract from those arising under the ERISA statute, and holds that the
exhaustion doctrine does not apply to the latter. Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody
& Co.43 and Zipf v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.44 are two seminal cases
decided by the Third Circuit that effectively present the rationale of the majority
view, and clarify the court’s reasoning in Stephens.
In Barrowclough, the plaintiff, an investment banker, had his employment
terminated after it was alleged that he mishandled various customer accounts.45
While employed, the plaintiff participated in a deferred compensation plan, the
terms of which would allow him to set aside in an account a portion of his pre-tax
salary and collect the accrued amount when he ceased to be an employee of the

41. See, e.g., Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required for plaintiffs bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim under
ERISA); Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 1990); Zipf v. Am.
Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889, 891-94 (3d Cir. 1986); Amaro v. Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751-52
(9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required to bring suit under
ERISA on the grounds that the statute creates certain non-waivable rights that are best protected by the
judiciary).
42. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
summary judgment grant against the plaintiff for her failure to exhaust all internal administrative
remedies noting that “Congress’ apparent intent in mandating internal claims procedures found in
ERISA was to minimize the number of frivolous lawsuits, promote a non-adversarial dispute resolution
process, and decrease the time and cost of claims settlement.”); Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 763 F.2d
1219, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[c]ompelling considerations exist for plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to instituting a lawsuit.”); Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the exhaustion of internal
administrative remedies for an ERISA claim on the grounds that “well-established federal policy, and
supporting case law, that [favors requiring] exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing an
ERISA-based lawsuit in federal court.”).
43. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985).
44. Zipf v. Am. Tel. and Tel., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1984).
45. Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d at 927 (“[The defendants claim] that [the
plaintiff] mishandled customer accounts, and the company was obliged to recredit the losses to two
customers’ accounts. On November 1, 1982, before his termination, [the plaintiff] signed an agreement
to pay approximately $165,000 that was being credited to those customers.”).
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firm.46 Upon the termination of the plaintiff’s employment, he made various
attempts to collect funds owed to him under the deferred compensation plan, only
to have his requests denied on his former employer’s assertion that any amounts he
accrued under the plan had been offset by the payment of claims relating to his
alleged mishandling of customer accounts.47 The plaintiff then sought redress in
the federal courts, filing a complaint containing nineteen counts—four of which
were under ERISA.48 Count One of the complaint sought to enforce payment
under the terms of the plan pursuant to ERISA’s civil enforcement provision.49
Count Two alleged a failure to provide an accounting, a requirement established by
ERISA.50 In addressing the plaintiff’s ERISA-based claims, the defendant firm
argued that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over the claims because the
plaintiff had formerly signed an agreement to submit to arbitration any conflicts
“arising out of [his] employment.”51
The court was thus charged with the task of interpreting the ERISA provision
in a manner that would balance the plaintiff’s right to access the federal courts to
litigate claims, with a strong congressional sentiment to promote private
arbitration.52 In balancing the two competing interests, the Barrowclough court
made a very important distinction between claims arising from a right created by
ERISA, and claims based purely on contractual rights under a pension plan.53 The
court, relying upon ERISA’s legislative history and the interpretation of similar
federal statutes, held that “claims to establish or enforce rights to benefits under
[ERISA] that are independent of claims based on violations of the substantive
provisions of ERISA are subject to arbitration, while claims of statutory violations
can be brought in a federal court notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate.”54 The
court thus held that the plaintiff’s claim to enforce the terms of the pension plan
was subject to arbitration as a claim independent of ERISA’s substantive
guarantees, while his claim for failure to provide accounting was a statutory issue
that fell within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.55
In marking the distinction between substantive claims under ERISA and those
relating to the enforcement of plan provisions, the court reasoned that “[t]here is an
inherent incapability in referring to an arbitrator claims that fall within the
46. Id. at 926-27.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 935. The Civil Enforcement provision of ERISA states, in relevant part, that a “civil
action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan” Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a) (1982).
50. Barrowclough, 752 F.2d at 927.
51. Id. at 937.
52. Id. at 939 (stating that “we must now accommodate [ERISA’s] policy of providing federal court
access and federal law remedies to pension claimants and their beneficiaries with the federal policy
favoring enforcement of arbitral agreements”).
53. Id. at 939-40 (stating that while “Congress intended that contractually-based pension claims
would remain subject to arbitral resolution . . . [the plaintiff’s] claim for damages under [ERISA] . . .
presents a pure statutory issue . . . [t]hat . . . is within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts.”).
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 940.
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exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and that arise as part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme designed to assure protection to those individuals who fall within
it.”56 In analyzing ERISA’s legislative history, the court noted that the statute
created substantive guarantees, and that Congress intended that those guarantees
would be protected by the federal court system, and not by arbitrators.57 Thus, the
court concluded, Congress’ “intent would be frustrated if arbitrators, who are not
bound to consider law or precedent in their decisions, and who decide issues
primarily on contractual grounds, had a conclusive role in deciding such claims.”58
The Barrowclough Court took significant steps in defining the scope of ERISA
by noting a distinction between substantive rights created by the statute, and those
that are guaranteed solely under the terms of the pension plan. The court thus
created a dichotomy between claims invoking ERISA substantive guarantees, and
those brought to enforce the terms of a particular plan, with the former falling
within the exclusive domain of the federal courts. In Zipf v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,59 decided one year after Barrowclough, the Third Circuit applied
the distinction enumerated in Barrowclough to a case involving a mixed question
of substantive and plan-based rights.60
In Zipf, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant company, brought an
ERISA claim after her employment was terminated while she was out of work on
medical leave.61 The plaintiff was informed that her employment was being
terminated during the seventh day of her leave and she claimed that the defendant
company terminated her employment because she would have been entitled to
significant benefits under the company-provided disability benefits plan on the
eighth day of her absence.62 The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to relief as a
result of the company’s interference with both her statutory rights under ERISA,
and her rights guaranteed by the plan.63 The defendant company moved for
summary judgment, asserting that because the plaintiff had not exhausted all
internal remedies available to her under the plan before bringing her federal court
claim, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.64 The district court found that
the exhaustion doctrine did apply to the plaintiff’s claim and granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.65
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied the framework
established in Barrowclough66 and conducted an analysis as to whether the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 940-941 (stating that “Congress further sought ‘to protect . . . the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries . . . by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to
Federal courts.’”) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982)).
58. Id. at 941.
59. Zipf v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 890.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. As in effect at the time, the relevant portion of ERISA stated that it is unlawful “for any
person to discharge . . . or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to
which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan” Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
65. Id. at 890.
66. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985).
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plaintiff’s claim invoked substantive rights grounded in ERISA, or whether her
claim involved contractual rights under the plan.67 The court, in determining
whether the plaintiff’s claim invoked statute-based protections under ERISA,
looked to Congress’ intent in enacting the provision.68 The court acknowledged
that the statute created a substantive right, noting that “Congress enacted this
section to prevent unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their
employees in order to prevent them from obtaining their statutory or plan-based
rights.”69 The court also noted that the plaintiff made “no claim for benefits [under
the plan] and concede[d] that she was not entitled to disability payments.”70
After finding that the plaintiff’s claim invoked a purely statutory right created
by Congress, the court viewed the claim in light of the rationales behind the
exhaustion doctrine.71 In conducting this analysis, the court recognized that the
doctrine:
[E]nsures that the appeals procedures mandated by Congress will be employed,
permits officials of benefit plans to meet the responsibilities properly entrusted to
them, encourages the consistent treatment of claims for benefits, minimizes the
costs and the delays of claim settlement in a nonadversarial setting, and creates a
72
record of the plan’s rationales for denial of the claim.

In applying the rationale behind the exhaustion doctrine to the plaintiff’s
claim, the court found that the benefits provided by the doctrine did not apply to
claims asserting statutory guarantees, noting that such a claim “asserts a statutory
right which plan fiduciaries have no expertise in interpreting.”73 Further, the court
held that “statutory interpretation is not only the obligation of the courts, it is a
matter within their peculiar expertise,” and noted that “there is a strong interest in
judicial resolution of these claims, for the purpose of providing a consistent source
of law to help plan fiduciaries and participants predict the legality of proposed
actions.”74 The court thus held that plaintiffs asserting a violation of a statutory
benefit under ERISA need not exhaust internal remedies before filing a federal
court claim.75
In holding that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to ERISA claims
involving statutory issues, the court in Zipf first looked to the nature of the claim to
determine if the rights asserted by the plaintiff were grounded in ERISA or if they
arose from the administration of the plan itself.76 Once the court determined that
67. Zipf, 799 F.2d at 892 (stating that “[w]hen a plan participant claims that he or she has been
unjustly denied benefits, it is appropriate to require participants first to address their complaints to the
fiduciaries to whom Congress, in Section 503, assigned the primary responsibility for evaluating claims
for benefits.”).
68. Id. at 891-92.
69. Id. at 891.
70. Id. at 893.
71. Id. at 892.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 893.
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. (holding that “an employee with a claim under Section 510 of ERISA need not submit that
claim to the plan before seeking relief in a federal district court.”).
76. Id. at 891 (finding that the plaintiff’s claims are “premised on Section 502(a)(3) . . . and are
brought not to enforce the terms of the plan, but to assert rights granted by the federal statute.”).
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the claim involved substantive statutory rights, it applied the rationale of the
exhaustion doctrine to the nature of the claim asserted and found that applying the
doctrine in such cases would effectively circumvent Congress’ intent to allow
courts to interpret federal statutes and would hinder the interest of creating a body
of federal common law interpreting the various rights and duties under ERISA.77
In contrast to the approach taken by the Barrowclough and Zipf courts, the
minority circuits have applied the exhaustion doctrine to all ERISA claims
irrespective of their character.
B. The Minority View
When confronted with the question of whether the exhaustion doctrine applies
in cases in which plaintiffs allege violations of their substantive rights guaranteed
under ERISA, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have arrived at the opposite
conclusion of the majority circuits, and have held that the doctrine does apply in
such cases.78 Kross v. Western Electric Co.79 is a Seventh Circuit case with a
similar procedural posture and factual background as the previously discussed Zipf
case, but differs from Zipf in that the court chose to apply the exhaustion doctrine
to a claim arising under the statute.80
In Kross, the plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant company, filed a
complaint alleging that the company terminated his employment for the sole
purposes of avoiding having to pay the plaintiff’s life and health insurance
premiums as was required under an employee benefit plan, and to prevent the him
from attaining a vested “service pension,” a benefit to which he would have been
entitled if he remained an employee for two more years.81 Similar to the plaintiff in
Zipf,82 the plaintiff in Kross alleged that his former employer violated ERISA by
unlawfully interfering with his right to obtain certain benefits owed to him under
the plan.83 The plaintiff did not avail himself of any internal remedies available to
him under the plan, and the defendant company relied upon this fact in moving for
summary judgment.84 The defendant argued that the plaintiff would not be entitled
to relief under ERISA because he failed to exhaust all internal remedies before
bringing suit in federal court.85 The district court agreed with the defendant
company about the application of the exhaustion doctrine and granted its motion
for summary judgment.86
On appeal, the court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment for

77. Id. at 893.
78. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1996); Mason v. Cont’l
Grp., Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1985); Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th
Cir. 1983).
79. 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983).
80. Id. at 1244 (affirming the district court’s decision requiring application of the exhaustion
doctrine).
81. Id. at 1239.
82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
83. Kross, 701 F.2d at 1239.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1240.
86. Id. at 1241.
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the company, concluding that the exhaustion doctrine did apply to the plaintiff’s
claim.87 Similar to the Zipf case, the court in Kross found that the plaintiff’s
interference claim invoked a purely statutory issue, and was wholly independent of
any contractual rights under the plan.88 The Kross court, however, held that
exhaustion was required even though the plaintiff’s claim arose from a right
protected by the statute.89 In arriving at its decision that the doctrine was
applicable in this case, the court looked to established precedent and Congressional
intent to support its reasoning.90 The court observed that Congress required
“covered plans to provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants . . . to
see that those remedies are regularly used” and that “trustees of covered benefit
plans are granted broad fiduciary rights and responsibilities under ERISA . . . and
implementation of the exhaustion requirement will enhance their ability to expertly
and efficiently manage their funds [without] premature judicial intervention in their
decision-making processes.”91 In finding that federal policy, Congressional intent,
and judicial precedent supported the application of the exhaustion doctrine to cases
alleging statutory violations, the court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the
federal courts were the only proper venue to interpret statutory violations of
ERISA, holding that his arguments were “insufficient to override the wellestablished policy, and supporting case law, favoring exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to bringing an ERISA-based lawsuit in federal court.”92
Kross is a prime example of the line of reasoning representative of the
minority of circuits who have held that the exhaustion doctrine applies to claims
involving statutory guarantees under ERISA, and highlights the distinctions upon
which the majority and minority circuits disagree. The courts in both Zipf and
Kross acknowledged that the claims presented by the respective plaintiffs involved
wholly statutory issues, and arose independently of any contractual rights provided
by the benefit plans. The court in Zipf, however, distinguished ERISA-based
claims from those arising under the benefit plan, by applying the framework
established in Barrowclough, and noted that special consideration must be given to
statutory claims, whereas contract claims were subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
In determining whether or not the doctrine applied to purely statute-based claims,
both courts looked to federal policy and legislative intent to decide the doctrine’s
applicability to those types of cases, but the courts arrived at markedly different
conclusions. The Zipf Court recognized the doctrine’s aims to ensure that the
administrative remedies mandated by Congress are utilized to allow expert plan
fiduciaries the opportunity to resolve issues arising under benefit plans, and to
increase the efficiency of claims settlement, but found that these objectives were
87. Id. at 1245 (holding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion when imposing the
exhaustion doctrine in this case and denying the plaintiff’s claim that [the defendant] improperly
interfered with the vesting of his service pension.”).
88. Id. at 1244 (holding that the plaintiff’s “civil action against [the defendant] falls within the
purview of § 502(a)(3) because it is based on alleged violations of the provisions of [ERISA], rather
than violations of the terms of a particular benefit plan.”).
89. Id. (holding that “federal policy expressed in case law, encouraging private resolution of
ERISA-related disputes, mandates the application of the exhaustion doctrine in this case.”).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1245 (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980)).
92. Id.
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not applicable to purely statutory claims, and held that that the application of the
doctrine to such claims would go against Congress’ intention that alleged violations
of protections provided under the statute be litigated in the federal courts.
The Kross Court, in arriving at the opposite conclusion, found that the
legislative history of the ERISA statute showed Congress’ intent to mandate
exhaustion of internal remedies in order to ensure that the administrative
procedures mandated by the statute were utilized, to increase efficiency in the
claims process, and to preserve judicial economy by preventing the filing of
frivolous lawsuits. The Kross Court thus concluded that the aims of the exhaustion
doctrine were in alignment with those of Congress, and that the prevailing contrary
arguments in Zipf were not sufficient to justify application of the doctrine to cases
involving alleged statutory violations under ERISA.
Understanding the line of reasoning invoked by the courts of the majority and
the minority circuits is important to establishing the major controversies
surrounding the application of the doctrine, and for analyzing how both sides arrive
at their conclusions. Neither the First Circuit, nor the Supreme Court have directly
addressed the issue, and a comprehensive overview of the majority and minority
views on the application of the doctrine will provide the framework through which
a prospective inquiry may be made into how the First Circuit or the Supreme Court
may dispose of the issue in light of the recent Stephens decision.
III. PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK: LOOKING FORWARD FROM STEPHENS
A. The Exhaustion Doctrine in the First Circuit
The First Circuit has yet to address the precise issue of whether the application
of the exhaustion doctrine is appropriate in claims arising under the ERISA
statute.93 Complicating matters further, the district courts within the First Circuit
are split, with some district courts holding that the doctrine does apply to statutebased ERISA claims,94 and others following the majority of the circuits and
holding that the exhaustion of internal remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing
forth an ERISA claim in the federal court system.95
Although the First Circuit has not addressed specifically the application of the
93. Edes v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60 (D. Mass. 2003).
94. See, e.g., Santana v. Deluxe Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 162, 174 (D. Mass. 1998) (concluding that
“[t]his Court agrees with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that strong policy reasons—most
prominently to render meaningful the Congressional mandate that all ERISA plans include an appeal
process—compel plaintiffs to exhaust all benefit denial claims, regardless of their nature.”); King v.
James River-Pepperell, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 54, 55-56 (D. Mass. 1984).
95. See, e.g., Treadwell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Mass. 1987)
(holding that “this court agrees with the Ninth and Third Circuits in Amaro and Zipf, that there is a
sensible distinction between plan-based and statute-based claims. A claim for benefits is a matter of
contractual interpretation of a specific pension plan. Such a matter can be fruitfully left to a trustee or
arbitrator charged with administration of that specific plan. A claim under . . . ERISA, on the other
hand, seeks to vindicate a right afforded employees by Congress. Evaluation of such a claim will be a
matter of statutory interpretation and application, and this is a matter most appropriate for judicial
determination.”); Morales-Cotte v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Yabucoeña, 73 F. Supp. 2d 153,
160 (D.P.R. 1999); Alexander v. Fujitsu Bus. Commc’n. Sys. Inc., 818 F. Supp. 462, 471 (D.N.H.
1993).
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exhaustion doctrine to statutory ERISA claims, it has addressed the applicability of
the doctrine in other contexts that may reveal which factors the Circuit would
consider when addressing the issue.96 In Strategic Energy, LLC v. Western
Massachusetts Electric Co.,97 the court discussed the factors that the First Circuit
has considered in determining when it is appropriate to apply the exhaustion
doctrine to claims arising under federal law, noting that the Circuit may consider:
[W]hether the issue under review is a pure matter of law versus a factual matter
where the agency’s specialized expertise will be helpful in resolving the dispute;
whether “the agency is empowered to grant meaningful redress;” whether “the
pursuit of the administrative remedies would be futile or inadequate,” and whether
requiring exhaustion will prevent parties “from weakening the position of the
98
agency by flouting its processes.”

In applying the factors outlined in Strategic Energy, it is likely that the First
Circuit—if faced with the question of whether the exhaustion doctrine would apply
to statute-based ERISA claims—would join the majority of the circuits in holding
that the doctrine does not apply to such claims, primarily because adjudicating and
granting relief for federal causes of action is within the sole province of the federal
courts.
In addressing the first two factors mentioned above, analyzing whether the
“issue under review is a pure matter of law versus a factual matter where the
agency’s specialized expertise will be helpful in resolving the dispute,”99 and
“whether ‘the agency is empowered to grant meaningful redress,’”100 it is fairly
certain that the First Circuit would find that these factors weigh against application
of the doctrine. Claims that arise under ERISA and not based in the terms of the
plan are purely issues of law that are best decided by the federal courts.101
The second factor to be considered by the Circuit—whether the plan
fiduciaries have been granted the power to grant meaningful relief—clearly
mitigates against the application of the doctrine to statute-based ERISA claims. In
enacting ERISA, Congress mandated that covered plans provide certain minimum
internal procedural safeguards.102 Congress simultaneously created a federal cause
96. See Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774-75 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing the applicability of
the exhaustion doctrine to a claim arising under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act);
Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77-78 (D.P.R. 1997) (discussing the applicability
of the exhaustion doctrine to a naval civilian employee’s wrongful termination claim).
97. 529 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233-34 (D. Mass. 2008).
98. Strategic Energy, LLC, 529 F. Supp. at 233 (citations omitted); see also Coles Express v. New
England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 702 F. Supp. 355, 363 (D. Me. 1988) (stating that
“[a]lthough the First Circuit has yet to rule on whether arbitration is mandatory in these circumstances
under [the applicable statute], Ezratty does indicate, at least in the absence of a legislative mandate of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, that a balancing test is to be employed.”).
99. Strategic Energy, LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
100. Id. (quoting Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997)).
101. See Zipf v. Amer. Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889, 893 (holding that “a [statute-based ERISA
claim] asserts a statutory right which plan fiduciaries have no expertise in interpreting,” and that
“statutory interpretation is not only the obligation of the courts, it is a matter within their peculiar
expertise.”).
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012) (declaring that all employee benefit plans shall “provide adequate
notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been

2015] STEPHENS V. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION 391
of action under which a plaintiff alleging a violation of his or her rights under the
statute may seek and obtain equitable relief,103 or money damages.104 Thus, plan
administrators may grant or deny benefits in accordance with a plan contract or a
general scheme of plan administration. They do not, however, have the authority to
grant relief created by a federal statute.
The final factor the First Circuit would likely balance in determining whether
the exhaustion doctrine should be applied to statute-based ERISA claims, is
“whether requiring exhaustion will prevent parties ‘from weakening the position of
the agency by flouting its processes.’”105 This factor, too, cuts in favor of a finding
that the doctrine does not apply in statute-based ERISA claims. In considering
whether exhaustion applies, the First Circuit would likely consider the impact
exhaustion would have on the agency’s (here the plan fiduciaries’) ability to
maintain the validity of its policies, without having federal courts override them
and impose their own.
Not requiring exhaustion for statute-based ERISA claims would not lead to the
“flouting” of the plan fiduciaries’ policies, as such claims arise under the statute,
and do not necessarily require an interpretation of the terms of a given benefit plan.
In acknowledging the difference between statutory claims under ERISA and
contractual claims under the terms of the plan, and requiring exhaustion for the
latter and not the former, the plan beneficiaries maintain the liberty to control plan
administration within the parameters of the applicable laws. Further, requiring
exhaustion for plan-based claims allows the plan fiduciaries to maintain the
authority to develop policies, hear appeals and render decisions as to the grant or
denial of benefits. After a plaintiff has exhausted all internal remedies in pursuing
a plan-based claim, courts have applied the heavily deferential “arbitrary and
capricious” standard in reviewing decisions made by plan administrators.106
In conclusion, when applying the balancing test established by the First Circuit
to determine whether the application of the exhaustion doctrine to statutory claims
is appropriate in the absence of an explicit Congressional mandate, the factors
considered weigh heavily in favor of not requiring exhaustion for three central
reasons. First, because of the inherently legal nature of statute-based claims,
federal courts are the proper venue to hear lawsuits, as the knowledge and expertise
of plan administrators offer little in the way of interpreting federal statutes.
Secondly, plan administrators work within the framework of private contracts and
are wholly unable to provide the type and quality of relief in response to
infringement of rights guaranteed by a federal statute. And finally, providing
claimants with direct access to federal courts does not impede upon the broad

denied . . . and afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been
denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.”).
103. Id. § 1132(a)(3) (granting the possibility of injunction relief for ERISA provisions).
104. Id. § 1132(c)(1).
105. Strategic Energy, LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (quoting Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770,
774 (1st Cir. 1981)).
106. See, e.g., Stuart v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D. Me. 1987) (holding that “[a]n
action brought . . . for benefits due under a pension plan requires the court to review the plan
administrator’s determination under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard. This standard has been
applied by every federal circuit court of appeals.”).
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authority Congress granted to plan fiduciaries to administer their pension plans and
implement their policies.
Whereas it is likely that the First Circuit would apply a balancing test when
determining if the exhaustion doctrine applies to statute-based ERISA claims, the
Supreme Court would probably look to precedent to drive its analysis.
B. The Exhaustion Doctrine in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, like the First Circuit, has not yet specifically addressed
the issue of the exhaustion doctrine’s application in statute-based ERISA claims.
In Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,107 however, the Court
acknowledged in dicta that the exhaustion doctrine applies to claims whereby a
plaintiff seeks to obtain benefits under an ERISA-covered plan.108 However, in
Larue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.,109 the Court suggested that plaintiffs
could circumvent the administrative exhaustion requirement if they asserted
statutory, rather than plan-based claims, but admitted that these questions are not
yet settled.110 This distinction between plan-based claims and those based in
federal statute recognized by the Court may help to predict how the precise issue
would be addressed by the land’s highest tribunal.
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., the Supreme Court faced
a similar question.111 At issue in Barrentine was whether a plaintiff could bring a
federal court claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act112 after having had a similar
claim rejected by a joint grievance committee in accordance with the procedures
established by his collective bargaining agreement.113 In determining whether the
plaintiff had a right to have his statutory claim heard in federal court, the Court
acknowledged that the issue invoked competing federal interests.114 The first was
the interest in promoting “negotiation of the terms of employment through the
collective-bargaining process” and the second, “reflected in statutes governing
relationships between employers and their individual employees, guarantees
employees specific substantive rights.”115 The Court noted that although there was
a strong federal interest in efficient management of work-related claims in
arbitration, in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act “Congress intended . . . to
107. 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013).
108. Id. at 609 (noting that “[c]ourts have generally required plan participants to exhaust the plan’s
administrative remedies before filing suit.”).
109. 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
110. Id. at 258-9 (Roberts, J., concurring) (holding that “[a]llowing a[n] action to [collect benefits
under the plan] to be recast as one [alleging breach of fiduciary duty] might permit plaintiffs to
circumvent safeguards for plan administrators that have developed,” and that “[a]mong these safeguards
is the requirement, recognized by almost all the Courts of Appeals that a participant exhaust the
administrative remedies”).
111. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
112. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
113. 450 U.S. at 730-31.
114. Id. at 734-735.
115. Id. at 734 (stating further that “[a] tension arises . . . when the parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement make an employee’s entitlement to substantive statutory rights subject to contractual disputeresolution procedures.”).
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achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or
employment,” and that “[a]ny custom or contract falling short of that basic policy,
like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be used
to deprive employees of their statutory rights.”116 The Court thus held that
preventing the plaintiff from bringing a claim asserting statutory rights on the basis
of an arbitration decision mandated by a collective bargaining agreement would
infringe upon Congress’ intent to create substantive employee rights, noting that
“[b]ecause the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather
than enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies
underlying [The Fair Labor Standards Act].”117 The Court further noted that “not
only are arbitral procedures less protective of individual statutory rights than are
judicial procedures, but arbitrators very often are powerless to grant aggrieved
employees as broad a range of relief.”118 The Court thus held that the plaintiff
could bring a federal suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act notwithstanding a
previous submission of similar claims to arbitration pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, noting that because “the [statutory rights] petitioners seek to
assert . . . are independent of the collective-bargaining process . . . [t]hey are not
waivable.”119
The issue of the application of the exhaustion doctrine to statute-based claims
in the context of ERISA involves some of the same factors—institutional
competence, Congressional intent, and the distinction between contractual and
substantive rights—that were discussed by the court in Barrentine. Using
Barrentine as a model, the Supreme Court is likely to hold that because the rights
asserted by plaintiffs alleging substantive claims are based in a federal statute, and
because the federal court system is entrusted with the duty to interpret statutes and
grant appropriate relief, requiring the exhaustion of internal remedies would alter
the benefits Congress intended to convey to plan beneficiaries, and strip the federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the decision in Stephens, the D.C. Circuit became the eighth circuit to
directly address the issue of whether the exhaustion doctrine may be applied in
cases invoking statute-based ERISA claims, and the sixth of which to hold that the
doctrine does not apply to such claims. Apart from tipping the scales further in
favor of the majority view, the Stephens decision provides an artful and thorough
analysis of the various issues pertinent to the controversy regarding the
applicability of the doctrine to cases raising statutory claims. In relying upon
precedent from the majority circuits, the Stephens court further affirmed the
proposition that the dual aims of providing aggrieved plan participants access to
federal courts, and ensuring that plan fiduciaries implement and maintain internal
remedial procedures, are best served by not applying the exhaustion doctrine to
116. Id. at 740 (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602603 (1944)).
117. Id. at 744.
118. Id. at 744-745.
119. Id. at 745.
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statutory claims under ERISA, but rather by providing expert plan fiduciaries great
control over the administration of the plan and its claim procedures, while
simultaneously allowing the federal courts to adjudicate claims based in federal
statute and create a substantive body of federal law upon which plan administrators
may rely. In finding that these dual aims are fulfilled more effectively by not
requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies for statute-based claims,
the Stephens court further diminished the viability of the argument proffered by the
minority of the circuits that exhaustion is required for all ERISA claims to ensure
that the internal remedies mandated by Congress are utilized and to prevent the
filing of meritless claims. Stephens thus represents the latest in a line of cases that
have held Congressional intent is better served—and institutional competency
greater preserved—by not requiring exhaustion in statute-based ERISA claims.

